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Abstract
We examine the dissent voting record of the Bank of England Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC) in its first decade. Probit estimates indicate the impact of career
experience on dissent voting is negligible, whereas the impact of forecast inflation is
pronounced. In addition to finding a role for dynamics, we also find a role for unob-
served heterogeneity in the form of member-specific fixed-effects, suggesting previous
literature characterizing voting behavior as largely determined by whether members
are appointed from within or outside the ranks of Bank of England staff (internal and
external members respectively) is overly simplistic.
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1 Introduction
A neglected aspect in the growing literature on Bank of England Monetary Policy Com-
mittee voting is the effect of career backgrounds and experience on dissent voting behavior.
This is in contrast to the literature on FOMC decision making, where the policy choices
of FOMC members, including dissent voting, is not only rigorously modeled as a function
of members’ career backgrounds, but found to be determined by such factors in economet-
ric estimations (see for example, Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990, Chappell et al. 1993,
2005, and more recently Adolph 2003). The conjecture that career experience may play a
role in determining voting decisions at monthly Bank of England MPC meetings is thus
not without empirical foundation, albeit based on evidence from its US counterpart. In
setting out to address career experience effects, this paper extends the existing literature
on MPC decision making in a number of ways. First, using binary and ordered probit
analysis, we directly test the hypothesis that different career backgrounds affect members’
decisions to cast dissenting votes: specifically, the impact of career experience on dissent
voting is estimated as part of a wider strategy which also seeks to gauge the correspond-
ing impact of the MPC’s inflation and output projections, a member’s ‘type’ (i.e., internal
versus external member), and different chairmen. Significantly, our analysis draws on
the theoretical model of Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) - hereafter the H-S model -
which predicts that different career backgrounds directly influence a member’s propensity
to dissent on the side of monetary ease and tightness. In the context of this paper these
backgrounds correspond to years spent working in the following areas or organizations:
academia; the Bank of England; banking and finance; government; industry; and non-
governmental organizations. Second, unobserved heterogeneity in the form of fixed and
random effects is introduced into the estimation strategy. This innovation is driven by
the observation that not all MPC members act in accordance with a view prevalent in
the literature, that compared to MPC members appointed from within the ranks of bank
staff, external MPC members choose lower interest rates (Gerlach-Kristen 2003), and are
even characterized by loss functions which are more sympathetic to deviations of output
from potential (Gerlach-Kristen, 2007). Both of these stylized facts may imply that ex-
ternal (internal) members are more predisposed to dissent on the side of monetary ease
(tightness), something which in practice is clearly not observed across all members. The
paper progresses as follows. We begin by relating our contribution to previous studies of
MPC voting behavior. We then set out the H-S model, and in addition to this, examine
why the frequency and nature of dissent voting associated with different MPC members
might a priori be expected to differ: other than career background effects, we posit that
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differences may be attributable to career concerns and the prospect of reappointment, the
appointments procedure, and members’ information sets and models of the economy. Evi-
dence on the dissent voting behavior of MPC members from June 1997 – May 2007 is then
presented. The H-S model is then taken to voting data, and the associated econometric
evidence presented. The paper then concludes.
2 Relationship to the Literature
The voting behaviour of Bank of England MPC members is gaining increasing attention
in the academic literature. In Gerlach-Kristen (2003), disagreements between members of
the Bank’s MPC typically constitute the rule, and not the exception. Internal members are
shown to dissent more frequently than external members, and although the author does
not appeal to econometric methods to model dissenting votes, a number of reasons are
suggested as driving dissent. These include career concerns, media publicity deriving from
the decision to dissent, and the information sets of MPC members. Using information
on dissents, Gerlach-Kristen (2007) employs simulation methods to show that external
members have asymmetric loss functions, and are more likely to respond to deviations
below as opposed to above potential output. The same author (Gerlach-Kristen, 2004)
also shows that disagreements at monthly meetings can predict interest rate changes. Fo-
cus on MPC voting is not confined to dissenting votes. Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005)
exploit the heterogeneity in members’ votes to shed light on the main determinants of
MPC decisions, allowing for the distinction between internal and external members in
their estimation approach. Spencer (2006) adopts a similar econometric approach to the
current paper using an ordered probit model to estimate the reaction functions of MPC
members. Similarly, Brooks et al. (2007) explain MPC voting using an inflated ordered
probit (IOP) model comprising a two-equation system of a “long-run” equation capturing
a binary decision to change or not change the interest-rate, and a “short-run” one based
on a simple monetary policy rule. Other studies of voting in monetary policy committees
have traditionally focused on the FOMC, with a large number falling into what Meade
and Sheets (2005) call the ‘partisan theory of politics’ genre (for example, Belden 1989,
Chappell et al. 1993, Havrilesky and Schweitzer 1990 and Krause 1996). Hallmarking
many of these studies is a role for political influence through the FOMC appointments
procedure and a prominent role for career backgrounds.1 Chappell et al (1993) find that
partisan behavior is partially attributable to the career backgrounds of FOMC members,
noting that “experience in government, particularly at the Federal Reserve Board, is asso-
ciated with significantly stronger preferences for monetary ease” (p.130). Adolph (2005)
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uncovers similar findings, and more recently, Meade and Stasavage (2008) have introduced
a role for career concerns, suggesting that members of a monetary policy committee are
less likely to voice dissent when the transcripts of FOMC meetings are placed in the public
domain.2 As a primary motivation of this paper is to test the model of Havrilesky and
Schweitzer (1990), it is to their contribution which attention now briefly turns.
3 Why Dissent? The H-S Model of Dissent Voting
Originally used to describe FOMC dissent voting, the H-S model is here both expounded
and applied to the Bank of England MPC. The model is premised on the notion that
the government has a time-consistent inflationary bias, a feature which is prevalent in the
literature on monetary policy: here, MPC members whose career backgrounds lie closer
to central government are more liable to conform to such bias, and the more one conforms
to it, the greater the propensity to dissent on the side of monetary ease. Conversely,
members whose experiences are relatively further from central government are more prone
to dissent on the side of monetary tightness.
Havrilesky and Schweitzer also assume there is a utility and disutility associated with
dissenting. Utility arises from a member believing it ismorally right to dissent - this is why,
even in the face of pressure to vote with the majority of MPC members, some individuals
may choose to make their differing opinion known through recording a dissenting vote.
On the other hand, disutility arises precisely because of the need for committee members
to fall into line with each other. There is some anecdotal evidence to suggest this may
in practice happen: recent work by Spencer (2006) shows that compared to external
members, internals are significantly more prone to vote as a bloc. While this may reflect an
institutional consensus amongst internal MPC members regarding the appropriate interest
rate, it is not implausible to suppose that such members desist from voting against their
colleagues specifically because they work for the same organization: the conjecture here is
that voting against one’s peers too often will be viewed in a dim light. Yet while dissent
voting is not actively encouraged, the individualistic nature of the MPC3 may lessen
the stigma attached to dissenting: Nakahara (2001), for instance, cites former external
MPC member DeAnne Julius as attributing dissent voting to individually accountability,
without which members would “lose the incentive to make public their position at the
voting stage even if they had voiced opposing views during the debate.” We propose that
while individual accountability may mitigate the stigma attached to dissenting, it does
not eliminate in altogether.
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3.1 Model
In setting out the formal model, we envisage an MPC composed of g members, each of
whom may have amassed career experiences, for different durations, in j different fields.
These experiences are referred to by H-S as a member’s career characteristics.4
For member g we denote her jth career characteristic as Xgj , such that Xj represents
the MPC’s mean for that characteristic. So-called ‘career proximity’ to central government
is increasing in Xgj − Xj such that Xgj − Xj > 0 (< 0) promotes dissents on the side
of monetary ease (tightness). As Xgj − Xj > 0 (< 0) becomes larger (smaller), so too
does the propensity to dissent on the side of ease (tightness). However, given there are j
characteristics, the extent to which a given MPC member dissents is ultimately a function
of how each characteristic is weighted. We are now in a position to write an expression
for member g’s utility, namely
Ug(Dg) = U(Dg | Xgj −Xj , j = 1, 2, ..., N) (1)
where ∂U
∂(Dg−Dg) < 0 and
∂2U
∂(Dg−Dg)2 > 0. In (1), the utility achieved by member g is
a function of the number of dissenting votes cast, the direction and number of which is
conditioned by career proximity parameters, Xgj−Xj , j = 1, 2, ..., N . It is further assumed
that (1) is characterized by a unique global maximum, which defines the optimal number
of dissenting votes, Dg. It turns out that the actual number of dissents cast by member
g, Dg, will not necessarily equal the number of dissents which maximize utility. This is
because members also experience disutility, an expression for which is given by
Vg(Dg) = V (Dg | Xgj −Xj , j = 1, 2, ..., N) (2)
which has a unique global minimum at Dg = 0. Here, the assumed properties of Vg(Dg)
– ∂V∂Dg > 0 and
∂2V
∂D2g
< 0 – imply that as the number of dissents moves further away from
zero, the disutility felt by member g increases at an increasing rate.
It is easily shown that when the marginal utility of increasing dissent equals the
marginal disutility of increasing dissent, member g’s net utility will satisfy an uncon-
strained maximum where:
∂U
∂Dg
=
∂V
∂Dg
. (3)
Put another way, marginal net utility must be zero. To glean the normative implications
of the model, H-S consider the conditions required to ensure a monotonic transformation
from the weighted career characteristic differences, Xgj − Xj , to the actual number of
dissents, Dg. Due to the nature of the first order conditions for utility and disutility in (1)
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and (2), the actual number of dissents is not guaranteed to map monotonically onto career
characteristic differences. Ensuring such a transformation requires the restriction that the
marginal net utility of the jth member increasing dissent towards her global optimum is
strictly less than that pertaining to the (j + kth) member: as Havrilesky and Schweitzer
state, this holds the implication that “a member with marginally stronger moral convic-
tions in favor of dissenting cannot be marginally more easily cowed by group...disapproval”.
3.2 Beyond Career Characteristics
In addition to the effect of career characteristics, a number of additional factors may in-
form the decision to dissent: these include the appointments procedure, tenure lengths,
prospects for reappointment and career concerns, members’ views about underlying struc-
ture of the economy, and members’ information sets.
The UK government does not play a role in all MPC appointments. The Governor
and the two Deputy Governors who sit on the MPC as internal members are all Crown
appointments, and although statutes prescribe that the two remaining internal members
(who are Executive Directors with responsibilities for different areas of banking operations)
are appointed to their positions by the Governor only after the Chancellor of the Exchequer
has been consulted, in practice, the Chancellor has little say in the matter.5 All external
members are chosen directly by the Chancellor. Drawing on the central bank independence
literature (Grilli et al. 1991, Cukierman et al. 1992), it might be argued that from an
appointments perspective, the Executive Directors enjoy most independence from the
government, which is likely to promote dissents on the side on monetary tightness.6
The central bank independence literature also suggests that longer term lengths in-
crease a central bank’s so called political independence from the government (Grilli et al.
1991). This is of interest insofar as both the Governor and two aforementioned Deputy
Governors are appointed for five year renewable terms, whereas all other MPC members
serve shorter three year renewable terms. In enjoying longer term lengths, the Governor
and the two Deputy Governors may be less susceptible to governmental pressure to reduce
interest rates. On this analysis, external (internal) members emerge as the least (most)
independent of all MPC members, making them more (less) likely to dissent on the side of
monetary ease.7 Further, what emerges from the preceding discussion of both tenure length
and appointments is that external members emerge as being the least independent of MPC
members, which suggests closest proximity to government. From an econometric perspec-
tive, this characteristic can be thought of as being implicitly embodied, for example, in a
dummy variable which captures the internal-external distinction.
There may also be a role for career concerns, particularly if some MPC members
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perceive a link between voting behavior and reappointment. This prospect has been rec-
ognized by members of the UK political establishment - Howard (2000) suggests that if
one is seeking reappointment, then voting for lower, as opposed to higher interest rates
may secure a second term. Yet there is little evidence to support this conjecture: first,
results from our econometric estimations do not support this hypothesis; second, Mervyn
King, who was reappointed to succeed Eddie George as Governor of the Bank and thus
Chairman of the MPC cast more dissenting votes on the side of monetary tightness than
any other MPC member up to the time of his reappointment.
Finally, different MPC members will invariably hold different views about the underly-
ing structure of the economy, and be exposed and receptive to different sources of economic
information. As Blinder (2007) notes, even when faced with the same information (for ex-
ample, as presented at the Bank’s monthly ‘pre-MPC’ meeting), different MPC members
may have contrasting views as to the appropriate policy stance. As all of these factors
represent potential sources of disagreement regarding interest rate policy, this may lead
to dissent voting.8
4 Dissenting Votes
All voting data is obtained from the Minutes of MPC Meetings, which identifies who the
dissenting voters are at each meeting, and whether they dissented on the side of ease or
tightness. We define two types of dissent voting: dissent for tighter policy and dissent for
looser policy. There are important caveats to these definitions, which are expounded as
follows:
(i) Dissent for tighter policy: Defined as where a member votes for a higher short-term
interest-rate than the rate chosen by the winning majority of MPC members. A member
may vote for no change or a decrease in the interest-rate but still be classed as dissenting
for tighter policy if the rate chosen by the MPC is lower than their chosen rate.
(ii) Dissent for looser policy: Defined as where a member votes for a lower short-term
interest-rate than the rate chosen by the winning majority of MPC members. A member
may vote for no change or an increase in the interest-rate but still be classed as dissenting
for looser policy if the rate chosen by the MPC is higher than their chosen rate.
Finally, we also find it useful to define as assenting vote as one which is cast in agreement
with the the winning majority of MPC members at each meeting.
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Table 1: Number of Dissenting Votes Cast by the MPC, June 1997-May 2007a
Ease Tightness All
Dissents Dissents Dissents
All Members 83(7.9)b 70(6.6) 153(14.5)
Internal Members 10(1.0) 41(3.9) 51(4.8)
External Members 73(6.9) 29(2.7) 102(9.7)
aResults based on data from 121 meetings.
bFigures in round brackets (·) express number of dissenting votes
cast as a percentage of all 1057 votes cast.
4.1 The MPC’s Dissent Voting Record
The paper now turns to the empirics. We show that while internal and external members
exhibit different voting patterns in the aggregate - as is evidenced in the literature (see for
example Gerlach-Kristen 2003) - such stylized facts mask considerable voter heterogeneity
within groups.
Table 1 documents the dissent voting behavior associated with the MPC. Columns (a)
and (b) show the number of dissenting votes cast on the side of ease and tightness respec-
tively. Column (c) shows the total number of dissenting votes, irrespective of direction.9
Figures in round brackets (.) express the number of dissenting votes cast as a percentage
of all votes cast.
When all votes are considered (irrespective of a member’s internal or external status),
dissenting votes cast for monetary ease and tightness are split relatively evenly (83 vs. 70
votes). This similarity is, however, deceptive: at a more disaggregated level, the pattern
of dissenting votes appears very different for internal and external members. External
members dissented exactly twice as often as internal members (102 vs. 51 votes), despite
casting fewer votes than internal members (591 vs. 466 votes). On average, just over one
in every five votes cast by external members was dissenting. This figure is just under one in
ten for internal members. Further, both groups cast dissenting votes at a rate of less than
one per meeting: external (internal) members on average cast four (two) dissenting votes
every five meetings.10 A two sample test of proportions (against a null of no difference)
accepts the hypothesis that external members dissent more often than internal members
(z = 6.083, p = 0). Turning to the composition of dissents, whereas internal members
are prone to dissenting on the side of tightness, external members do so on the side of
monetary ease. Approximately 75 percent of all dissenting votes cast by external members
are for looser policy, as opposed to around thirteen percent for internal members.
Yet as suggested previously, focusing on the disparity between internal and external
members may be too simplistic a device to characterize MPC voting. This is reflected in
Table 2, which shows the dissent voting behavior of MPC members at an individual level.
Out of the fourteen external members in the sample, six members (Buiter, Goodhart,
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Table 2: Number of Dissenting Votes Cast by Individual MPC Members,
June 1997-May 2007
Ease Tightness All
Internal Members Votesa Dissents Dissents Dissents
Eddie George 74 0 0 0
Howard Davies 2 0 0 0
Mervyn King 121 0 13 13
Ian Plenderleith 61 2 3 5
David Clementi 61 1 3 4
John Vickers 28 0 5 5
Charles Bean 81 4 0 4
Paul Tucker 60 1 6 7
Andrew Large 40 0 9 9
Rachel Lomax 47 2 2 4
John Gieve 16 0 0 0
Total 10 41 51
External Members
Willem Buiter 36 8 9 17
Charles Goodhart 36 0 3 3
DeAnne Julius 45 14 0 14
Sir Alan Budd 18 0 4 4
Sushil Wadhwani 37 13 0 13
Stephen Nickell 73 13 4 17
Christopher Allsopp 37 11 0 11
Kate Barker 61 4 1 5
Marian Bell 36 5 0 5
Richard Lambert 34 0 0 0
David Walton 12 1 2 3
David Blanchflower 12 4 0 4
Tim Besley 9 0 3 3
Andrew Sentance 8 0 3 3
Total 73 29 102
aDenotes total number of votes cast by each member
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Budd, Walton, Besley and Sentance) cast more dissenting votes on the side of tightness
than ease. Moreover, the reputation for externals to cast dissenting votes on the side
of monetary ease seems to be driven by just four individuals: Julius, Wadhwani, Nickell
and Allsopp. Excluding Buiter, whose numerous tightness dissents are balanced by a
significant number of ease dissents, and Lambert, who did not dissent, the remaining
members cast only a modest amount of ease dissents. In short, externals are seen to
exhibit considerable heterogeneity in their dissent voting behavior. Turning to internal
members, two individuals - Mervyn King and Andrew Large - might be viewed as driving
tightness dissents. Moreover, once King is omitted from the sample, the total number of
tightness dissents cast by internals fall to a figure below that of externals (28 vs. 29 votes).
Further, while internals are less prone to cast dissenting votes per se (put another way,
they are far more likely to be on the winning side of a decision), four members (excluding
Davies who cast only two votes) buck the trend that internals are more likely to dissent
on the side of tightness – Bean, Lomax, Gieve and George. The reason for George casting
no dissents may be precisely down to his role MPC Chairman between June 1997 - May
2003: he was never on the losing side of a decision due to his power to make the policy
proposal at each meeting.11
5 Career Background Data
Prior to estimation, we first define our variables. To capture career background effects,
a series of covariates proxying members’ career characteristics are constructed. Career
backgrounds are categorized according to years spent working in six broadly defined cat-
egories:12
(i) Academia - refers to years working at a university in an academic capacity.
(ii) Bank - denotes the number of years employed at the Bank of England.
(iii) Finance - refers to positions held in banking and finance.
(iv) Government - denotes years spent working in the civil service or for the UK Govern-
ment.
(v) Industry - refers to years spent an economist in industry.
(vi) NGO - refers to non-governmental organizations. This covers both national and inter-
national independent research organizations such the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD), and transnational institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO) and Bank for International
Settlements (BIS).
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Our classification system covers only full time positions and secondments held by MPC
members up to but not including time working on the MPC; excluded from the criteria
are all part-time positions, special advisory roles and academic consulting. Consequently,
all time served on the MPC - which technically constitutes a full-time position working
for the Bank of England - is purposely neglected.
We assume that backgrounds in academia, finance, at the Bank of England and NGOs
promote tightness dissents: in the case of academia, this reflects the large impact of the
literature on time-consistent monetary policy, and the view that experience in academia
promotes independent thinking hence lowering members’ susceptibility to yield to short-
run political pressures. Experience at the Bank of England is assumed to engender an
acute aware of the inflationary consequences of activist monetary policy, thus promoting
tightness dissents. For ‘career’ central bankers, dissenting on the side of monetary tightness
may also be used to signal their credentials as being ‘conservative’ or ‘inflation-averse’.
Finally, the inclusion of finance and NGOs reflects a view that such careers are removed
from governmental power and influence. We also propose that time spent in industry
and government will promote ease dissents. In the case of industry, while rising prices
may imply higher wage claims and thus rising costs for the firm (prompting calls for the
monetary authorities to bring inflation under control through tightening interest rates),
ease dissents are more likely to be promoted as higher interest rates hit the ability of
firms to invest and borrow, reduce consumer expenditure, and reduce the international
competitiveness of products for export through exchange rate effects.
For the purposes of econometric estimation, and in line with H-S, these variables are
subsequently manipulated: for each MPC member, experience within each career category
is expressed as the difference between the number of years spent working in that category
and the committee mean for that category. From Table 3, it can be thus be inferred that
the Committee means for career experience, and thus career experience variables - which
we label AcadD, BankD, FinD, GovtD, IndD and NGOD, where D denotes ‘deviation from
the committee mean’ - will vary over time due to members’ overlapping terms. Indeed,
the nature of overlapping terms is shown in Table 3. On average, the composition of the
MPC changed approximately every six months, raising the prospect that over the sample
period, as different personalities both entered and left the group, the decision making
dynamics of the committee underwent considerable change.
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Table 4: MPC Members’ ease and tightness dissenting votes explained by
differences between their career characteristics and Committee means for
those characteristicsa
Constant AcadD BankD FinD GovD IndD NGOD−0.186 0.021 0.1162 0.0056 0.0529 0.3433 −0.889
(0.162) (0.019) (0.029)∗∗∗ (0.030) (0.023)∗∗ (0.063)∗∗∗ (0.135)∗∗∗
Summary Statistics
AIC BIC
150.989 172.209
aRobust standard errors in round (·) brackets. No of obs = 153.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗Denotes two-tailed significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
5.1 Estimation
5.1.1 Binary Probit (BP) Estimates
The first set of regressions is based on a truncated dataset comprising only the dissenting
votes cast by MPC members (n = 153), and is analogous to the estimation in Havrilesky
and Schweitzer (1990). Specifically, we estimate a binary probit (BP) regression of the
form
Zgt = β0 + β1AcadD + β2 BankD + β3FinD
+β4 GovD + β5IndD + β6NGOD + uj (4)
where Zgt = 1 (0) denotes a dissenting vote on the side of monetary tightness (ease).
Results are presented in Table 4, and suggest that while career experience in academia
and finance do not contribute to a member’s propensity to dissent in either direction,
years spent at the Bank of England, and in Government and Industry, promote tightness
dissents, whereas NGO experience promotes dissents on the side of monetary ease. Clearly,
many of these results run contrary to our predictions: other than time spent at the Bank
of England, career effects in every statistically significant category have the opposite effect
than expected.
5.1.2 Potential Shortcomings
The estimation strategy outlined above using (4) suffers from a number of shortcomings.
First, it ignores all votes cast in agreement with the policy proposal (assenting votes)
and as such, we may be wasting information contained in the voting record. Second, our
estimations do not control for the presence of other factors which determine the decision
to dissent (consequently, for example, omitted variable bias may be present). Third, and
building on the first point, through ignoring assenting votes, the small sample size pre-
cludes us from pursuing estimation strategies which condition on unobserved heterogeneity
13
or address dynamics. We return to the issue of dynamics in Section 5.2.
To address the first shortcoming we extend the econometric framework such that when
voting on the policy proposal, MPCmembers are viewed as being faced with three mutually
exclusive choices: to dissent on the side of ease, to assent, or to dissent on the side of
monetary tightness. A natural candidate for modeling such behavior is the ordered probit
(OP) model,
Z∗gt = x
′
gtβ + εgt (5)
Zgt = −1 if Z∗gt ≤ γ1
Zgt = 0 if γ1 < Z∗gt ≤ γ2 (6)
Zgt = 1 if Z∗gt > γ2
where Z∗gt is a stacked m × 1 vector of −1s, 0s and 1s corresponding to members’ votes
to dissent for looser policy, assent, or dissent for tighter policy. xi is a m × h matrix
containing h independent variables, and β is a 1× h vector of parameter estimates.
To address the second shortcoming, the xgt matrix contains the covariates listed in (4)
plus the following: Type is a binary variable where a one (zero) is assigned if a member
is an internal (external) member. Based on the discussions presented in Sections 2 and
4.1 a positive sign is expected, reflecting the more general finding in Gerlach-Kristen
(2003) that whereas internal (external) members are more likely to dissent on the side of
monetary tightness (ease). To control for economic conditions, we construct Taylor-rule
type covariates based on the MPC’s in-house inflation and output growth forecasts as
published in the Bank’s quarterly Inflation Report. Forecast horizons in line with views
expressed by the MPC (Bank of England, 1999) that interest-rate changes take two years
to maximally impact inflation, and approximately one year for output are chosen. The
published modal projections are then ‘adjusted’ following Goodhart (2005),13 and are
expressed in deviation form: specifically, output growth minus potential (assumed to be
2.4 percent p.a.) and the deviation of inflation from target: we denote these forecasts
piG and GDPG.14 To account for the possibility that internal and external members may
not respond equally to changes in macroeconomic conditions (based on the discussion of
members’ information sets and economic models in Section 3.2), two interaction terms are
introduced, (Type× GDPG) and (Type× piG). Lastly, to capture the impact under different
MPC chairmen (Governors George and King), we include the binary variable Chair, which
assumes a value of one (zero) if King (George). We note here that two additional variables
- a dummy to capture the impact of gender, and a reappointment dummy to proxy for
the role of career concerns - were introduced, but subsequently dropped from estimations
14
as they proved to be consistently insignificant.
We now address the third shortcoming. As there are repeated observations for indi-
vidual MPC members, it is possible to condition on unobserved individual heterogeneity
by augmenting equation (5) to include an unobserved effect, αg:
Z∗gt = x
′
gtβ + αg + εgt. (7)
This begs the question of how to treat the αg. Whilst non-linear panel data estimation
has traditionally focussed on treating unobserved heterogeneity as random due to the
‘incidental parameters’ problem (Neyman and Scott, 1948), recent developments suggest
that nature of our sample permits a fixed-effects estimation strategy. Specifically, we
are in a position contrary to that typically observed in the panel data literature, with
small cross-sectional component relative to the sample (i.e., large T and small N). The
overwhelming majority of the 25 MPCmembers in the sample are observed over a relatively
large time period (t = 1, . . . , Ti): other than Davies (Ti = 2) - who was removed from the
sample due to an insufficient number of observations - the number of time periods ranged
from Ti = 8 (Besley) to Ti = 121 (King). Heckman (1981) suggests that a temporal
sample size of T = 8 is sufficient for any significant fixed T bias to have essentially
disappeared. Greene (2004) provides further evidence, citing a significant reduction in
biases from T = 3 onwards. In light of these arguments, we include fixed-effects dummies
for all MPC members bar Davies. This amounts to relaxing the commonly maintained
assumption of
E
(
x′gtαg
)
= 0, ∀g, t. (8)
The baseline equation on which estimation is based hence becomes
Z∗gt = x
′
gtβ + αgDg + εgt, (9)
where Dg represents a dummy variable for member g.
5.1.3 Ordered Probit (OP) Estimates
Estimates for the ordered probit model are shown in Table 5. Huber-White (robust) stan-
dard errors are given in round (.) brackets, with corresponding levels of significance, where
***,**,* denote 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. AIC and BIC denote the Akaike
and Bayesian information criteria, where a smaller value suggests a better specification.
Model 1 is the OP analogue of equation (4), and can be viewed as a ‘baseline’ specification:
indeed, the results are qualitatively the same as in Table 4, albeit the magnitude of the
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parameters fall substantially for each covariate. Whereas Model 2 controls for economic
conditions and Chairman effects, in Model 3 this is augmented to control for the impact
of a member’s internal or external status through introducing the Type dummy and in-
teraction terms. Clearly, career background parameters are very robust to specification
change, and the inclusion of additional variables in Models 2-3 does not drastically affect
their values significantly. Such a move is also desirable based on AIC and BIC grounds.
Further, in Models 1 to 3, the joint hypothesis of career backgrounds having no significant
effect in driving dissent was rejected outright. Yet as is the case for BP estimation, many
of the career effect results run contrary to our predictions, and where career variables are
highly significant, the impact on dissent voting is negligible (this assertion is also based
on calculating marginal effects, which are not reported here).
The fixed-effects specification (Model 4) excludes career characteristics for two reasons:
first, inclusion of career covariates generated fixed-effects estimates which were nonsensi-
cal.15 A possible explanation for this finding outcome is that career covariates are highly
correlated with member dummies, and although they vary across time for each member,
they may lack sufficient variation to avoid collinearity. Second, because career experience
is by definition specific to each member, it represents an individual characteristic, which
in addition to factors such as a member’s information set and model of the economy,
is already captured by a member’s fixed-effects dummy. Crucially, most member dum-
mies exhibited significance at the five percent level or less, and a test of the hypothesis
that fixed-effects dummies are jointly insignificant was rejected outright, (χ222 = 153.16,
p = 0.000), as was a test for the joint equality of coefficients (χ222 = 164.24, p = 0.000).
Most member dummies are also negatively signed. This reflects the fact that King (the
omitted dummy) cast a substantial number of tightness dissents relative to other mem-
bers. Coupled with the tests of equality and joint significance, the number of statistically
significant dummies is indicative of considerable voter heterogeneity.
Some commentary on the additional covariates in Models 2-4 is also appropriate: while
piG and GDPG are highly significant across all specifications, GDPG is negatively (and thus
not correctly) signed. This result was not anticipated, and is not easy explained. Saying
this, the magnitude of the piG parameter is substantially greater than that corresponding
to GDPG, implying deviations from target inflation play a much larger role in driving
dissent than comparable deviations of GDP growth from its assumed trend. Finally,
the significance of the Type dummy and both interaction terms in Model 3, provides
support for the notion that internal and external members respond differently to changes
in macroeconomic conditions. The significance of the inflation interaction term in model 3
and is of some interest: it suggests that as forecast inflation moves further from its target
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rate, some members react differently to others, favoring different interest rates. In turn
this leads to disagreements, thus giving rise to dissenting votes. This finding is consistent
with the earlier conjecture that not all members have the ‘same model’ of the economy
in their heads. It is also reinforced by the significance of members’ fixed effects dummies,
which we assume embody such differences of opinion, in models 4. Finally, the effect
under different the chairman is ambiguous – parameter estimates for Models 2 to 4 range
from negative and marginally significant (Model 2), insignificant (Model 3) to positive and
significant (Model 4).
In terms of model selection, the information criteria do not select any model unani-
mously: according to BIC, Model 3 performs best, while Model 4 is preferred by AIC. In
some respects, this result is unsurprising: due to its asymptotic consistency and its heavy
penalty on complexity, BIC typically selects more parsimonious specifications. Conversely,
AIC often chooses less parsimonious specifications as complexity is not so heavily penal-
ized, especially for small or moderate sample sizes. However, it is notable that alternative
goodness of fit measures not reported here (McFadden’s R2 and Adjusted R2, Cox-Snell
Maximum Likelihood R2, Cragg-Uhler R2 and McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2) all identify
Model 4 as having the best explanatory power.16
5.2 Dynamics
As a final innovation, we introduce dynamics in the form of lagging the dependent variable
by a single period. This is a potentially attractive innovation: from a behavioral perspec-
tive, it addresses the possibility that the period t decision to dissent may be partially
determined by the t− 1 decision to dissent. Put another way, a consequence of dissenting
in period t− 1 is that the choice to dissent next period may be different than if the indi-
vidual had assented. Further, the inclusion of dynamics allows us to examine the extent
to which past dissents play a role in predicting future dissents.
Given estimation strategies for dynamic panels are typically designed to address bias
arising for small T and large N - a situation we are in a contrary position to – we assume
any potential bias arising in our estimations disappears, or is negligible in size (the vast
majority of individuals in the sample have T > 30, with an average number of 43 observa-
tions per member).17 Also, the fact that lags may be correlated with the fixed effects is of
less concern than under random effects, where the assumption of zero correlation between
the random effects and all explanatory variables (see equation (8)) would be violated. We
therefore augment the OP specifications in Table 5 with two indicator variables for the
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lagged dependent variable Z∗g,t−1:
Z∗gt = ϕ0Zeaseg,t−1 + ϕ2Z
tightness
g,t−1 + x
′
gtβ + αgDg + εgt, (10)
where ϕ0 and ϕ2 are parameters to be estimated and Zeaseg,t−1 (Z
tightness
g,t−1 ) is an indicator
variable constructed from Z∗g,t−1, such that a value of one denotes a dissenting vote on the
side of ease (tightness) and a zero denotes otherwise. Table 6 shows the results. To make
the impact of adding lags more readily comparable with the static specifications in Table
5, their dynamic counterparts are labelled Model 1L, Model 2L, Model 3L and Model 4L,
where the last specification in Table 6 excludes career characteristics for reasons noted
previously.18
According to AIC and BIC measures, each dynamic specification outperforms its static
counterpart. Significantly, results bear a strong resemblance to those in Table 5: the
qualitiative findings are virtually identical, and are clearly robust to the inclusion of the
extra lag variables. This is also true for joint tests of insignificance and coefficient equality
for the fixed-effects dummies in Model 4L, which were again overwhelmingly rejected. We
thus restrict our focus to the predictive impact of the lag variables.
The effect of adding lags is illustrated in Table 7, where predictions of Model 3L
are generated by holding career variables at their means and setting GDPG=piG=0. For
simplicity we focus on the internal-external distinction (through setting Type to one or
zero), and compare the predicted probabilities associated with each group of: (i) dissenting
on the side of ease in period t under Zeaseg,t−1 = 0 and Zeaseg,t−1 = 1; and (ii) dissenting on the
side of tightness in period t under Ztightnessg,t−1 = 0 and Z
tightness
g,t−1 = 1. In (i) we also base our
calculations on the condition that when Zeaseg,t−1 = 0, Z
tightness
g,t−1 = 0. Equivalent conditions
are imposed under (ii).19 Results show that for internal and external members alike, a
dissent in t− 1 substantially raises the probability of casting the same type of dissenting
vote in the following period: the increases in probability lie between 0.26 and 0.39 (as
shown in the rows labeled ‘Difference’). This finding suggests past dissenting behavior
influences current dissenting behavior.
6 Conclusion
At the outset of this paper, we set out to explain the type and frequency of dissenting
votes cast by MPC members, with emphasis on career background effects. To motivate
the issue of dissent voting, we re-visited the contribution of Havrilesky and Schweitzer
(1990), and applied it to the Bank of England’s MPC. In addition to this, we rationalized
why discrepancies between internal and external members might arise, and proposed the
18
internal-external distinction was too simplistic: voting patterns exhibit considerable het-
erogeneity across all members. The econometric evidence presents something of a ‘career
background puzzle’ – unlike the FOMC literature, career experience plays a very weak role
in determining a member’s decision to dissent: moreover, where career backgrounds are
significant, they are often counter-intuitively signed. Other evidence was mixed. While
the role of different chairmen is ambiguous, the deviation of the MPC’s inflation forecast
from target is consistently significant, correctly signed, and relative to other parameters
exerts the largest impact on a member’s decision to dissent. This is, arguably, not un-
expected for an institution such as the Bank of England, whose primary objective is to
target inflation. Finally, we identified a significant role for dynamics, where a dissent for
monetary ease or tightness increases the likelihood of it being followed by a dissent in the
same direction.
Future work in this area might compare the determinants of dissent voting in different
monetary institutions such as the US Federal Reserve, Swedish Riksbank and Bank of
Japan. Moreover, as more central banks delegate monetary policy to committees, and
place the voting record in the public domain, investigation of this issue can only heighten
our understanding of monetary policy, and of the individuals and institutions that shape
it.
19
Notes
1However, it is worth noting here that FOMC studies are geared towards the institutional nuances of
the US Federal Reserve and political system. As our entire sample period falls within the incumbency
of the British Labour Party, appealing to political partisanship to explain dissent voting is rendered less
plausible than for FOMC studies where the monetary policy preferences of individual members are modeled
as a function of the political affiliation of the individuals who appointed them. Such studies typically
cover periods encompassing different political administrations, Republican and Democrat. For example,
Chappell et al (1993) find that the power of appointment provides ‘an important channel of systematic
partisan influence’ (p.209).
2Under sequential voting (the practice currently enjoyed by MPC members) the presence of career
concerns may also have consequences for voting outcomes, a view espoused in the herding literature. If
committee members simply echo the choice of the first member to declare her view, not only might a “false
consensus will be achieved” and members’ information wasted (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990, pp.477-478),
but internal members may simply ‘follow the leader’, falling in line with the Governor who frames the
policy question on which MPC members vote. For this reason, the UK government has aired views to
the effect that it would prefer MPC members to vote simultaneously. We do not model this scenario in
this paper. (Response of the Government to the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, HL Paper 34, Session 2000-01.)
3See for example Blinder and Wyplosz (2004) and Blinder (2007).
4The practical analogue of these j characteristics would be experiences in different sectors or areas of
the economy, such as private industry and finance. These measures are developed in Section 5.
5We thank Charles Goodhart for clarifying this matter.
6Other aspects of the appointments procedure have received noteworthy attention. Cobham (2000)
argues that the appointments procedure is opaque and open to political opportunism. The opaque nature
of the appointments procedure is additionally captured in a Treasury select committee hearing where
Richard Lambert (who joined the MPC in May 2003) was asked whether ‘a couple of calls to Japan was
all there was to becoming a member of the MPC.’ (Oral evidence of Mr. Richard Lambert, taken before
the Treasury Committee on Monday 16 June 2003).
7The above discussion suggests the original H-S model in Section 3.1 may be conditioned by additional
factors, where the expressions for utility and disutility in equations (1) and (2) are augmented to give
Ug(Dg) = U(Dg | Xgj −Xj , Ig − I, j = 1, 2, ..., N)
Vg(Dg) = V (Dg | Xgj −Xj , Ig − I, j = 1, 2, ..., N)
where Ig denotes member g’s measure of independence from the government, such that Ij represents the
MPC’s mean for that measure. Here, the Ig − I term measures a member’s ‘independence proximity’
to central government and is increasing in Ig − I such that Ig − I > 0 (< 0) promotes dissents on the
side of monetary ease (tightness). Provided the same assumptions with respect to first and second order
conditions corresponding to (1) and (2) apply, the implications stemming from the theory outlined in 3.1
remain intact.
8In May 2002, Sushil Wadhwani, an external member who served on the MPC between June 1999-May
2002 claimed that monetary policy was ‘held too tight because of a biased forecast’ (Wadhwani (2002),
p.1.): the main inflation projection in the May 2002 Inflation Report assumed a ‘higher pass-through
into prices’ than was probable (p.3) and the level of potential output was deemed ‘too pessimistic’ (p.10).
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This is perhaps unsurprising: as Charles Goodhart notes, the introduction of external MPC members
into a Committee forecasting process such as the one underlying the Bank’s quarterly Inflation Report
projections, is ‘inevitably likely to generate some tension and disagreements’ (Goodhart (2001), p.62).
Also see Blanchflower (2006).
9In the first decade of the Bank of England MPC almost fifteen percent of votes cast by its members
were dissents. This figure is markedly higher than the portion of dissenting votes associated with monetary
policy committees at comparable institutions such as the US Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan and the
Swedish Riksbank.
10Exact permutation tests were also used extensively to test for differences in the dissent voting behavior
associated with internal and external members at each MPC meeting. For each individual meeting nine
hypotheses were examined, and in all 121 sets of test statistics were generated: specifically, for each type
of dissenting vote defined in Section 4 (dissent irrespective of direction, dissent for tighter policy, dissent
for looser policy), we tested for whether (1) internal members cast such votes more often than external
members (one-tailed test), (2) external members cast such votes more often than internal members (one-
tailed test), and (3) whether there was any general difference between groups (two-tailed test). Each
hypothesis was tested against a null of no difference in voting behavior. When judged against conventional
levels of significance, members do not differ in their dissent voting behavior. However, the very small
sample size (MPC membership ranged from six to nine individuals) raised problems of statistical power,
and specifically, the prospect of failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is false (i.e., a type II error).
Moreover, it was found that for a test to have any statistical power at conventional levels (power = 0.8),
all internal members would have to dissent while all external members assented.
11Significantly, it is possible for the Chairman to lose a vote. This happened for the first time during
the 100th meeting of the MPC in August 2005, when Governor King was on the losing side of a 5-4 split.
Having ascertained the policy stances of all committee members, King tabled a policy proposal which he
then proceeded to vote against.
12During the process of constructing these variables, it was found that the average level of academic
experience enjoyed by MPC members at successive MPC meetings has not dropped substantially over
the first decade of the MPC. However, experience at the Bank of England has dropped markedly, whilst
industry experience has risen. This is true for internal and external members alike.
13Goodhart argues that the ex-post nature of the Bank’s published forecasts diminishes their importance
in explaining the MPC’s policy decisions: this is because in practice MPC members react to ex-ante
forecasts (i.e., conditioned on the interest-rate set by the MPC in the previous month). We use the ex-post
forecasts to construct proxy ex-ante forecasts. These forecasts are potentially much closer to those on
which individual voting decisions are based.
14Estimations were also performed using Taylor-rule type variables constructed from real-time consensus
forecasts of GDP growth and inflation, obtained from HM Treasury’s Forecasts for the UK Economy.
Published monthly, this is a compendium of forecasts produced by city and independent forecasters. We
note that whilst decisions on UK interest rates are in part a function of the Bank’s central inflation and
GDP projections, their quarterly nature makes their incorporation into our econometric framework difficult
- this is because the MPC make interest rate decisions on a monthly basis. For this reason, and to take
into account new forecast information available to MPC members at each monthly meeting, we ran also
regressions using these new variables. Results consistently placed a smaller parameter on the inflation term,
although the output term was still negative and often insignificant. All other parameters were robust to
the inclusion of these alternative forecasts. However, we opted for the results based on the MPC’s Bank
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forecasts due to their purported importance in informing the MPC’s decisions. Full consensus estimation
results are available from the authors on request.
15Results available from the authors on request.
16For completeness, we also performed estimations treating the αg in equation (7) as random. Wooldridge
(2002), for instance, states that ‘it almost always make sense to treat the unobserved effects as random’.
The presence of AR(1) errors is also modeled. This latter strategy allows for the fact that ‘just as observed
covariates can change over time, so too can unobserved influences and determinants of the outcomes’
(Heiss, 2007). The random effects model (7) thus becomes
Z∗gt = x
′
gtβ + αgt + εgt εgt ∼ iid(0, σ2ε) (11)
where
αgt = ραg,t−1 + vit. vit ∼ iid(0, (1− ρ2)σ2) (12)
Here, αgt is an i.i.d. random variable with zero mean and variance σ
2, only now the unobserved hetero-
geneity obeys a stationary AR(1) process over time with correlation parameter ρ. It is noteworthy that if
αgt = αg ∀ t, equation (11) reduces to the standard random effects model (see Heiss 2007 for full details).
Results are shown in Table 8, where we note that for Models 6 and 7 (random effects) ρ is interpreted
as the proportion of variance explained by the panel-level variance, and for Models 7 and 8, ρ represents
the correlation parameter in equation (12). We restrict our attention to career background covariates, the
estimated parameters of which are highly similar to those in Models 1, 2 and 3: experience in academia
and finance is not statistically significant, while industry and NGO experience exert the greatest impact
(while still having incorrect signs). Interestingly, AIC and BIC identify the AR(1) model, which confirms
the presence of high degree first order serial correlation, as superior to the RE specifications.
17The bias of including a limited dependent variable declines with T under both the random and fixed
effects approach. We do, however, note the nature of our sample renders certain estimation strategies
impractical due to degrees of freedom issues, such as Wooldridge (2005), which would require the inclusion
of T = 121 time dummies.
18A linear probability least squares dummy variable (LPM-LSDV) approach was also used. We also
estimated two specifications:
Zeasegt = Zeaseg,t−1 − x′gtβ + αgDg + εgt,
Ztightnessgt = Z
tightness
g,t−1 − x′gtβ + αgDg + εgt,
where Zeasegt (Ztightnessgt ) is a binary variable where a value of one denotes a dissenting vote on the side of ease
(tightness) and a zero denotes otherwise. We further note that while augmenting the LSDV model with
a lagged dependent variable potentially downward biases parameter estimates for small T , Monte Carlo
analysis suggests any bias created maximally affects the lagged dependent variable (i.e., Judson and Owen,
1999). Yet while a bias corrected LSDV estimator (e.g., Kiviet, 1995) may be recommended, the vast
majority of individuals in the sample have large T . It thus seems reasonable to assume that, as is the case
with the dynamic OP estimates, any bias will be small. However, unlike the OP model, this estimation
strategy does not utilize all of the information contained in the voting data, specifically with respect to
the observations assigned zeros. Estimations are available from the authors on request.
19Relative to casting an assenting vote in period t − 1, dissenting for monetary ease (or tightness) in
period t − 1 significantly reduces the period t probability of dissenting in the opposite direction. This is
true for all specifications in Table 6.
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Table 5: Determinants of Dissent: Ordered Probit Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a
γ1 −1.51(0.62)∗∗∗ −1.680 (0.098)∗∗∗ −1.39 (0.120)∗∗∗ −2.085 (0.161)∗∗∗
γ2 −1.60(0.65)∗∗∗ 1.602 (0.102)∗∗∗ 1.993 (0.142)∗∗∗ 1.508 (0.155)∗∗∗
piG − 2.889 (0.452)∗∗∗ 4.926 (0.705)∗∗∗ 3.078 (0.525)∗∗∗
GDPG − −0.393 (0.098)∗∗∗ −0.578 (0.158)∗∗∗ −0.292 (0.117)∗∗
Type − − 0.574 (0.110)∗∗∗ −
Type × piG − − −3.75 (0.859)∗∗∗ −
Type × GDPG − − 0.377 (0.176)∗∗ −
Chair − −0.187 (0.112)∗ −0.137 (0.114) 0.361 (0.164)∗∗
AcadD 0.010(0.08) 0.009 (0.008) 0.018 (0.008)∗∗ −
BankD 0.052(0.08)∗∗∗ 0.054 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.045 (0.009)∗∗∗ −
FinD 0.014(0.09) 0.015 (0.008)∗ 0.019 (0.008)∗∗ −
GovD 0.026(0.08)∗∗∗ 0.027 (0.008)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.009)∗∗ −
IndD 0.115(0.019)∗∗∗ 0.121 (0.029)∗∗∗ 0.128 (0.019)∗∗∗ −
NGOD −0.236(0.032)∗∗∗ −0.254 (0.029)∗∗∗ −0.223 (0.031)∗∗∗ −
George − − − −0.669 (0.145)∗∗∗
Plenderleith − − − −0.564 (0.281)∗∗
Clementi − − − −0.519 (0.231)∗∗
Vickers − − − −0.001 (0.287)
Bean − − − −0.723 (0.179)∗∗∗
Tucker − − − 0.047 (0.244)
Large − − − 0.663 (0.247)∗∗∗
Lomax − − − −0.375 (0.301)
Gieve − − − −0.417 (0.145)∗∗∗
Buiter − − − −0.741 (0.445)∗
Goodhart − − − −0.363 (0.245)
Julius − − − −2.134 (0.264)∗∗∗
Budd − − − 0.211 (0.323)
Wadhwani − − − −2.027 (0.266)∗∗∗
Nickell − − − −1.025 (0.258)∗∗∗
Allsopp − − − −1.753 (0.262)∗∗∗
Barker − − − −0.630 (0.221)∗∗∗
Bell − − − −1.438 (0.288)∗∗∗
Lambert − − − −0.355 (0.140)∗
Walton − − − 0.161 (0.643)
Blanchflower − − − −1.868 (0.401)∗∗∗
Besley − − − 0.872 (0.050)∗∗
Sentance − − − 1.005 (0.460)∗∗
Summary Statistics
AIC 1020.07 978.7319 949.6397 921.816
BIC 1059.687 1033.201 1018.964 1060.466
aKing is the omitted variable; Davies dropped due to insufficient observations.
Standard errors in round (·) brackets;/Denotes internal/external member.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗Denotes two-tailed significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. No of obs = 1045.
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Table 6: Determinants of Dissent: Dynamic Ordered Probit Estimates
Model 1L Model 2L Model 3L Model 4aL
γ1 −1.689 (0.071)∗∗∗ −1.823 (0.108)∗∗∗ −1.572 (0.134)∗∗∗ −2.228 (0.172)∗∗∗
γ2 1.701 (0.074)∗∗∗ 1.671 (0.107)∗∗∗ 1.987 (0.149)∗∗∗ 1.556 (0.166)∗∗∗
Zeaseg,t−1 −1.315 (0.165)∗∗∗ −1.238 (0.167)∗∗∗ −1.105 (0.174)∗∗∗ −0.968 (0.190)∗∗∗
Ztightnessg,t−1 1.044 (0.195)∗∗∗ 0.916 (0.194)∗∗∗ 0.884 (0.197)∗∗∗ 0.723 (0.205)∗∗∗
piG − 2.272 (0.463)∗∗∗ 3.650 (0.710)∗∗∗ 2.549 (0.544)∗∗∗
GDPG − −0.343 (0.098)∗∗∗ −0.484 (0.156)∗∗∗ −0.256 (0.121)∗∗
Type − − 0.460 (0.120)∗∗∗ −
Type × piG − − −2.499 (0.882)∗∗∗ −
Type × GDPG − − 0.284 (0.179) −
Chair − −0.164 (0.116)∗ −0.126 (0.118) 0.271 (0.172)
AcadD 0.005 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) 0.013 (0.009) −
BankD 0.037 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.041 (0.009)∗∗∗ 0.034 (0.009)∗∗∗ −
FinD 0.010 (0.008) 0.011 (0.008) 0.014 (0.008)∗ −
GovD 0.015 (0.009)∗ 0.016 (0.009)∗ 0.011 (0.008) −
IndD 0.084 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.090 (0.021)∗∗∗ 0.097 (0.021)∗∗∗ −
NGOD −0.184 (0.032)∗∗∗ −0.199 (0.033)∗∗∗ −0.176 (0.034)∗∗∗ −
George − − − −0.622 (0.158)∗∗∗
Plenderleith − − − −0.497 (0.313)
Clementi − − − −0.472 (0.256)∗
Vickers − − − 0.075 (0.311)
Bean − − − −0.709 (0.198)∗∗∗
Tucker − − − 0.023 (0.264)
Large − − − 0.569 (0.266)∗∗
Lomax − − − −0.554 (0.302)∗
Gieve − − − −0.451 (0.153)∗∗∗
Buiter − − − −0.601 (0.426)∗
Goodhart − − − −0.327 (0.267)
Julius − − − −1.837 (0.303)∗∗∗
Budd − − − 0.193 (0.328)
Wadhwani − − − −1.708 (0.305)∗∗∗
Nickell − − − −0.960 (0.255)∗∗∗
Allsopp − − − −1.532 (0.295)∗∗∗
Barker − − − −0.617 (0.241)∗∗
Bell − − − −1.289 (0.303)∗∗∗
Lambert − − − −0.382 (0.151)∗∗
Walton − − − 0.666 (0.401)∗
Blanchflower − − − −1.699 (0.493)∗∗∗
Besley − − − 0.829 (0.529)
Sentance − − − 0.577 (0.588)
Summary Statistics
AIC 891.1816 870.8825 859.8905 840.7838
BIC 940.4669 934.9535 938.7471 988.64
aKing is the omitted variable; Davies dropped due to insufficient observations.
Standard errors in round (·) brackets;/Denotes internal/external member.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗Denotes two-tailed significance at the 1%/5%/10% level. No of obs = 1021.
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Table 7: The effect of lagging the dependent variable on the decision to
dissent
Predicted probabilities
of dissentinga
Ease Internal External
Zeaseg,t−1 = 0 0.08 0.17
Zeaseg,t−1 = 1 0.39 0.57
Difference 0.30 0.39
Tightness
Ztightnessg,t−1 = 0 0.24 0.12
Ztightnessg,t−1 = 1 0.57 0.38
Difference 0.33 0.26
aResults based on Model 3L holding
career variables at their means and
GDPG=piG=0.
Table 8: Ordered Probit Estimates: Random Effects and AR(1) Errors
Random Effects AR1 Errors
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
γ1 −1.711 (0.147)∗∗∗ −1.815 (0.124)∗∗∗ −3.22 (0.530)∗∗∗ −3.311 (0.551)∗∗∗
γ2 1.794 (0.148)
∗∗∗ 1.796 (0.119)∗∗∗ 0.240 (0.039)∗∗∗ 2.586 (0.399)∗∗∗
piG 3.072 (0.501)
∗∗∗ 3.040 (0.485)∗∗∗ 4.317 (1.063)∗∗∗ 4.469 (1.047)∗∗∗
GDPG −0.329 (0.118)∗∗∗ −0.305 (0.107)∗∗∗ −0.905 (0.307)∗∗∗ −0.918 (0.298)∗∗∗
Chair 0.298 (0.162)∗ −0.089 (0.130) −0.696 (0.402)∗ −0.650 (0.356)∗
AcadD − −0.001 (0.011) − 0.014 (0.028)
BankD − 0.046 (0.010)∗∗∗ − 0.096 (0.032)∗∗∗
FinD − −0.007 (0.011) − 0.024 (0.026)
GovD − 0.056 (0.010)∗∗∗ − 0.049 (0.031)
IndD − 0.105 (0.023)∗∗∗ − 0.213 (0.068)∗∗∗
NGOD − −0.299 (0.404)∗∗∗ − −0.464 (0.115)∗∗∗
ρ 0.351 (0.056)∗∗∗ 0.461 (0.068)∗∗∗ 0.869 (0.036)∗∗∗ 0.814 (0.044)∗∗∗
Summary Statistics
AIC 956.3496 939.6596 865.9159 857.2228
BIC 986.0603 999.0809 900.5783 921.5959
Standard errors in round (·) brackets. No of obs = 1045.
∗∗∗/∗∗/∗Denotes two-tailed significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
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